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I. INTRODUCTION
This article argues that there are strong normative reasons to treat
American terrorists, abroad and within the United States, as
individuals who have committed treason. For the purposes of this
article, “American terrorists” refers to persons recognized as
American citizens under the Constitution of the United States who
commit acts defined under one of the following statutes: 18 U.S.C. §
2331(1), 1 18 U.S.C. § 2232b, 2 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, 3 or 18 U.S.C. §
* After receiving his Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of California,
Berkeley in 1958, Amitai Etzioni served as a Professor of Sociology at Columbia
University for twenty years. He was a guest scholar at the Brookings Institution in
1978 before serving as a Senior Advisor to the White House from 1979–80. In
1980, Etzioni was named the first University Professor at The George Washington
University, where he is the Director of the Institute for Communitarian Policy
Studies. From 1987–89, he served as the Thomas Henry Carroll Ford Foundation
Professor at the Harvard Business School. The author would like to thank Ashley
McKinless for research assistance on this article, as well as a young colleague,
whose place of employment does not permit that he be identified.
1. 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1) (2012) (defining “international terrorism” as activities
that “a) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of
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2339B. 4 It is important to note that these statutes are not the only
statutes available to prosecute terrorism related offences in the
United States. In fact, often perpetrators recognized by the American
public as “terrorists” are actually prosecuted for various nonterrorism related offenses. 5 Americans who commit or materially
criminal laws . . . b) appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian
population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or
coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction,
assassination, or kidnapping; and c) occur primarily outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States . . . .”)
2. 18 U.S.C. § 2232b (2008) (defining “acts of terrorism transcending national
boundaries” as “(1) Whoever, involving conduct transcending national boundaries
and in a circumstance described in subsection (b)– (A) kills, kidnaps, maims,
commits an assault resulting in serious bodily injury, or assaults with a dangerous
weapon any person within the Unites States; or (B) creates a substantial risk of
serious bodily injury to any other person by destroying or damaging structure,
conveyance, or other real or personal property within the United States or by
attempting or conspiring to destroy or damage any structure, conveyance, or other
real or personal property within the United States; in violation of the laws of any
State, or in the United States, shall be punished as prescribed in subsection (c) . . .
(g)–As used in this section– . . . (5) the term “Federal crime of terrorism” means an
offense that– (A) is calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government by
intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct . . .).
3. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2009) (defining providing material support to terrorists
as “[w]hoever provides material support or resources or conceals or disguises the
nature, location, source, or ownership of material support or resources, knowing or
intending that they are to be used in preparation for, or in carrying out, a violation
of [a number of listed sections] or in preparation for, or in carrying out the
concealment of an escape from the commission of any such violation, or attempts
or conspires to do such an act, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more
than 15 years, or both, and , if the death of any person results, shall be imprisoned
for any term of years or for life . . . .”).
4. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2009) (defining providing material support or
resources to designated foreign terrorist organizations as “[w]hoever knowingly
provides material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or
attempts or conspires to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than 15 years, or both, and if the death of any person results, shall be
imprisoned for any term of years or for life. To violate this paragraph a person
must have knowledge that the organization is a designated terrorist organization
(as defined in subsection (g)(6)), that the organization has engaged or engages in
terrorist activity (as defined in section 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act), or that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorism (as
defined in section 140(d) (2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal
Years 1998 and 1989)).
5. See RICHARD B. ZABEL & JAMES J. BENJAMIN, JR., IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE:
PROSECUTING TERRORISM CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 1 (July 2009), available
at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/090723-LS-in-pursuit-
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support terrorist acts are widely held as commanding rights above
and beyond those to which other so called terrorists are entitled;
however, Americans commit a serious offense when they raise their
arms against their nation, a crime that other terrorists are incapable of
committing. To put it differently, when Americans attack the United
States, they often commit two offenses: acts of terrorism and the
undermining of trust that Americans invest in each other—trust that
serves as a basis for a robust civil society. Whether or not a particular
suspect committed treason—the only crime treated thoroughly in this
article—should be determined through two distinct sets of processes
that the U.S. Constitution explicitly lays out: “on the Testimony of
two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open
Court.” 6 The forum in which these witnesses present their evidence
depends on whether these terrorists can be captured and brought
before a tribunal without subjecting U.S. troops to undue risk.
The terms “treason” and “traitor” raise the hackles of many people
because such terms remind them of accusations all too quickly hurled
by demagogues. At the same time, one cannot ignore that members
of a community can and do betray the trust of their fellow
community members. It might help readers to think about the acts of
treason considered here as referencing assaults on the community
and actual terrorist attacks, rather than trumped-up charges of
disloyalty. Unfortunately, the word “treason” cannot be avoided in
what follows, since it is the term that the Constitution employs.

A. FOCUS ON AMERICAN TERRORISTS
Often when the issue of American terrorists is debated, the
objections raised concern the targeted killing or the non-civilian
persecution of any terrorist, U.S. citizen or not. These objections
include questions about the legitimacy of killing terrorists either
outside of a declared zone of war, without a declaration of war, or
without a trial in a civil court. 7 However, the question about
justice-09-update.pdf (explaining that many “alternative” prosecutions based on
non-terrorism charges such as immigration fraud, financial fraud, and false
statements have been preemptive prosecutions that focused on preventing and
disrupting terrorist activities); see also id. Figure 12 at 12 (demonstrating the
various U.S. Statutes used to prosecute terrorism).
6. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3.
7. See Kenneth Anderson, Targeted Killing and Drone Warfare: How We
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American citizens arises only if one agrees that the killing of
terrorists is legal in general, when the targeted individual is not a
U.S. citizen. If no terrorist may be killed in such a way, then
logically the same would hold true for Americans. This article takes
for granted that killing terrorists, if they cannot be captured without
undue risk to U.S. troops, is legal and legitimate, on the grounds of
self-defense; 8 that membership in a declared terrorist organization
suffices to qualify an individual as a terrorist; and that Congress’
Authorization for Use of Military Force (“AUMF”) 9 authorizes the
use of lethal force by the President and those he commands against
those whom the President determines planned, authorized,
committed or aided in the terrorist attack that occurred on September
11, 2001. 10 One may disagree about any or all of these points;
however, they are not relevant to the question of whether American
terrorists should be treated differently from foreign terrorists.
If one accepts, even merely for sake of argument, the preceding
point, one should then note that the 2012 Justice Department White
Paper, which purports to explain when the government can “use
lethal force in a foreign country outside the area of active hostile
activities against a U.S. citizen,” fails to achieve its goal. 11 The three
Came to Debate Whether There Is a ‘Legal Geography of War’, in FUTURE
CHALLENGES IN NATIONAL SECURITY AND LAW 1, 3–4 (Peter Berkowitz ed.,
2011); Beau Barnes, Reauthorizing the 'War on Terror': The Legal and Policy
Implications of the AUMF's Coming Obsolescence, 211 MIL. L. REV. 57, 75–76
(2012); Richard Murphy & Afsheen John Radsan, Due Process and Targeted
Killing of Terrorists, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 405, 408–09 (2009).
8. Jordan J. Paust, Self-Defense Targetings of Non-State Actors and
Permissibility of U.S. Use of Drones in Pakistan, 19 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y
237, 238–41 (2010) (recognizing that international law, along with patterns of
practice and legal expectations, allow for a state's right of self-defense against a
target outside its own borders).
9. Authorization for the Use of Military Force Pub. L. No. 107–40, 115 Stat.
224 (2001) (“That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate
force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned,
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September
11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future
acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations,
organizations or persons.”).
10. David Glazier, Playing by the Rules: Combating Al Qaeda Within the Law
of War, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 957, 960 (2010) (stating that the AUMF is
logically sourced in the law of war governing international armed conflicts).
11. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LAWFULNESS OF A LETHAL OPERATION DIRECTION
AGAINST A U.S. CITIZEN WHO IS A SENIOR OPERATIONAL LEADER OF AL-QA’IDA
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conditions it lists—that the person be a senior operational leader of al
Qaeda or an associated force, that his capture be deemed infeasible,
and that the United States follow the applicable law of war
principles 12—apply indiscriminately to terrorists who meet such
criteria and therefore do not explain why one should set aside the
special standing Americans command, the “extra” protections
granted to them as citizens, above and beyond those of non-citizen
terrorists. 13 In fact, in specifying U.S. citizens who are members of al
Qaeda, the white paper waters down a standard set by the Warren
Court, by which membership in an organization is not enough to
justify criminal punishment—there must also be intent to carry out
the unlawful aims of the prescribed organization. 14 There is
disagreement about whether Americans overseas possess all
constitutional rights, but there is very little disagreement as to
whether they have at least some protections not granted to foreign
nationals. In Reid v. Covert, 15 Justice Harlan rejected that Fourth and
Fifth Amendment criminal protections “are never operative without
the United States,” but also disagreed “with the suggestion that every
provision of the Constitution must always be deemed automatically
applicable to American citizens in every part of the world.” 16 In
applying the guarantees of the Constitution one must take into
account “particular circumstances, the practical necessities, and the
possible alternatives.” 17 For example, minor offenses committed
overseas might not require a trial by jury due to the practical
difficulties such a requirement presents. In 2007, the Court of
OF AN ASSOCIATED FORCE

(2013), available at http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/
msnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf.
12. Id.
13. See David Cole, Are Foreign Nationals Entitled to the Same Constitutional
Rights As Citizens?, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 367, 369, 382 (2003) (arguing that
most distinctions between foreign nationals and citizens are not consistent with
constitutional and international law); Gerald L. Neuman, The Extraterritorial
Constitution After Boumediene v. Bush, (Harvard Pub. L. Working Paper No. 0839, 2008).
14. Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154 (1971)
(holding that “knowing membership in an organization advocating the overthrow
of the Government by force or violence, on the part of one sharing the specific
intent to further the organization's illegal goals, may be made criminally
punishable” (emphasis added)); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
15. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
16. Id. at 74.
17. Id.

128

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[29:1

Appeals of the Second Circuit held that the standard of protection
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment may vary when applied to
citizens overseas. 18 In contrast, the Supreme Court held in United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez 19 that “[t]he Fourth Amendment does not
apply to the search and seizure by United States agents of property
owned by a nonresident alien and located in a foreign country.” 20 In
2003, the Supreme Court ruled that alien residents convicted of
“aggravated felonies” can face mandatory detention—a double
standard justified by the fact that “Congress regularly makes rules
that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.” 21 In Johnson v.
Eisentrager, 22 the Court stated that a resident alien “has been
accorded a generous and ascending scale of rights as he increases his
identity with our society,” but that “the security and protection
enjoyed while the nation of his allegiance remains in amity with the
U.S. are greatly impaired when his nation takes up arms against
us.” 23
Hence, the normative and legal question stands: Should American
terrorists be treated differently from others? What distinct procedures
are to be employed in determining their treatment? In what legal
forum should they be tried?

B. THE NORMATIVE GROUNDS
Libertarianism and some forms of liberalism are normative
systems that are centered on individuals and their rights.
Communitarianism is a normative system centered on the common
good and the responsibilities that emanate from this shared
understanding that the members of the community are expected to
uphold. Liberal (or responsive) communitarianism seeks to balance
these two sets of normative concerns, and determine if individual
rights or social responsibilities should take precedence when the two
cannot be reconciled. 24 This article describes, from a liberal
18. In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr., 552 F.3d 157, 167
(2d Cir. 2008).
19. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
20. Id. at 259.
21. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 511 (2003).
22. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
23. Id. at 770, 771.
24. See AMITAI ETZIONI, THE NEW GOLDEN RULE: COMMUNITY AND
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communitarian perspective, the circumstances under which
American terrorists can be legally subjected to targeted killings while
outside the United States and the proper procedures for dealing with
those who can be captured. 25
Liberal communitarianism grants that Americans have extra rights
but stresses that they also have responsibilities to the national
community that foreigners do not have. Note that “responsibilities to
the national community” does not refer merely to the civic
obligations due to the state (e.g., observing the laws, paying taxes,
serving on a jury, and serving in the armed forces if there is a draft).
Communitarians view nations as communities invested in states, of
which people are not merely citizens but also members. Economists
may see here a matter of implicit contract and incentives. Thus,
neighbors will watch over the property of those who live next door
when they are away on travel, on the implicit assumption that the
favor will be returned. This arrangement holds for scores of other
matters, from watching out for children, to maintaining the front
lawns to ensure each other’s property values, to making donations to
keep the community center open.
In contrast, sociologists will suggest that these communal
obligations rest not so much on economic calculations of costs and
benefits, but on a sense of internalized responsibility. In effect, both
considerations interact; one may start with a sense of obligation but
if not reciprocated, it will diminish, though a perfect symmetry or “a
clearing of the books” is not expected. 26 Most revealing, community
members, including those of imagined communities (e.g., “the
nation”), have a sense of commitment to one another based on the
sense that they have a shared identity, history, future, and fate. While
it is true that some people are devoted to much smaller communities,
such as their ethnic or confessional group, the sense of respect for the
community and its welfare is particularly strong at the national level,
as revealed by the fact that many citizens are willing to die for the
MORALITY IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (1998); see also The Responsive
Communitarian
Platform,
THE
COMMUNITARIAN
NETWORK,
http://communitariannetwork.org/about-communitarianism/responsivecommunitarian-platform/ (last visited July 5, 2013).
25. See infra Part II.B.
26. See H. Lorne Carmichael & W. Bentley MacLeod, Gift Giving and the
Evolution of Cooperation, 38 INT’L ECON. REV. 485, 502, n.3 (1997).

130

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[29:1

preservation of their country, especially when defending it against
attacks by outsiders.
From this communitarian viewpoint, when an American terrorist
attacks, threatens to attack, or joins a group whose goal is to terrorize
the United States, that person commits an additional normative
violation, beyond that committed by other terrorists. He raises arms
against his own kind, he betrays the community which he is
committed to uphold, he fails to live up to responsibilities he has
assumed, and he undermines the community of which he is a
member—a community that has protected and nurtured him and his
loved ones. This is, on its face, a serious normative violation, and, to
reiterate, one that only Americans can commit against their nation.
Moreover, such assaults sow distrust. If the members of a
community find that they cannot trust their own kind, they are
particularly likely to feel terrorized and be suspicious of one and all.
It is enough to recall the poisonous social climate at the height of the
McCarthy era, when people felt that there was “a communist under
every bed”—even though there was only a tiny number of Americans
who actually betrayed their country—to sense the kind of social
malaise that would arise if a large number of Americans did indeed
aid and abet the enemy. 27 Also, American terrorists are more likely
than others to successfully carry out an attack, given that they hold
American passports and are familiar with American ways, culture,
and modes of communication. Thus, deterring them is of special
value to U.S. security.

II. A LEGAL EXPRESSION
Which legal expression is most suitable to the communitarian
normative precept just presented? This article first discusses the legal
category and then the attending procedures and forums for
prosecution.

A. THE LEGAL FOUNDATION
The actual text of the Constitution clearly and quite explicitly
treats treason as an offense different from all others. Article III
27. See Amitai Etzioni, Charge American Terrorists with Treason, THE
ATLANTIC, May 24, 2013, www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/05/chargeamerican-terrorists-with-treason/276199.
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Section 2 speaks of “all crimes,” while Section 3 is entirely set aside
to deal with treason. 28 Federal law runs along the same lines:
“Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States, levies war against
them or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within
the United States or elsewhere, is guilty of treason.” 29 The fact that
the text considers two types of betrayal—war or merely adhering to
enemies—speaks directly to those who claim that the United States
can use its military only against nations and not against non-state
actors. For example, Wayne McCormack argues that, “[u]ntil the
international community defines terrorist crimes as being violations
of the ‘law of war,’” the United States should try these individuals in
civilian courts not in front of military commissions “because there is
no coherent distinction between the alleged terrorist and the ordinary
street criminal”—American or otherwise. 30 This notion is a rather
bad case of legalism given that a group of terrorists armed with
weapons of mass destruction poses a much greater threat to the
United States than to many other nations. In effect, it is a long time
since any nation reaped as much destruction and terror on the United
States as nineteen attackers did on 9/11. In Cedar & Washington
Associates v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey, U.S. District
Judge Alvin Hellerstein explicitly recognized that previous acts of
terror were not “equal in organizational scope or destructive intent to
al Qaeda.” 31 However, presumably employing lethal force against
non-state actors also requires a declaration by Congress, as happened
three days after 9/11 with passage of the AUMF. 32 Those who hold
AUMF to be too vague or otherwise in need of revision are
effectively arguing for a new AUMF, and not against the legitimacy
of engaging in armed conflict with non-state actors. Though several
scholars hold that such a declaration must be limited to particular
28. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3 (“Treason against the United States, shall
consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving
them Aid and Comfort.”) (emphasis added).
29. 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (2012).
30. Wayne McCormack, Military Detention and the Judiciary: Al Qaeda, the
KKK, and Supra-State Law, 5 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 7, 71 (2004).
31. In re Sept. 11 Litig. Cedar & Wash. Assocs., 2013 WL 1137320, at * 10
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2013).
32. See generally Donna Cassata, Congress Rethinks 9/11 Law on Military
Force,
Use
of
Drones,
HUFFINGTON POST (May 16,
2013),
www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/16/congress-911lawﬂnﬂ3288164.html?view=print&comm_ref=false.
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theaters of war, this concept is obsolete in a world in which terrorists
consider borders to be only a minor inconvenience, and cyber space
is rapidly emerging as a vulnerable, transnational, borderless arena. 33
It is true that, throughout American history, very few individuals
have been convicted of treason and, of those, several were
pardoned. 34 However, treating American terrorists as individuals
guilty of treason is far from unprecedented. For example, Herbert
Hans Haupt, a naturalized citizen of German descent, was convicted
of treason by a military tribunal and executed for his participation in
a failed Nazi-backed sabotage plot. 35 Martin James Monti, a
lieutenant who deserted the Army Air Forces during WWII, was
convicted of treason and sentenced to twenty-five years for his work
as a Nazi propagandist. 36 Tomoya Kawakita, a dual U.S.-Japanese
citizen was convicted of treason for torturing American prisoners of
war during World War II. 37 More recently, in 2006, Adam Gadahn
became the first American indicted for treason since WWII. 38
Gadahn, who was raised in California, converted to Islam and moved
to Pakistan where he “chose to join our enemy and to provide it with

33. See Vincent-Joël Proulx, If the Hat Fits, Wear It, If the Turban Fits, Run
for Your Life: Reflections on the Indefinite Detention and Targeted Killing of
Suspected Terrorists, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 801, 849 (2005) (noting that the war on
terror is a truly global campaign because terrorism is a problem crossing numerous
borders); Mary Ellen O’Connell, When Is a War Not a War? The Myth of the
Global War on Terror, 12 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 535, 536 (2005); Paul R.
Pillar, The Limitless Global War, NATIONAL INTEREST, June 19, 2012,
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/paul-pillar/the-limitless-global-war-7094.
34. Richard Z. Steinhaus, Treason, A Brief History with Some Modern
Applications, 22 BROOK. L. REV. 254, 258–63 (1956); Paul T. Crane, Did the
Court Kill the Treason Charge?: Reassessing Cramer v. United States and Its
Significance, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 635, 636–37 (2009); Kristen E. Eichensehr,
Treason in the Age of Terrorism: An Explanation and Evaluation of Treason’s
Return in Democratic States, 42 VAND. J.TRANSNAT’L L. 1443, 1452–54 (2009).
35. See German Espionage and Sabotage Against the U.S. in World War II:
George John Dasch and the Nazi Saboteurs (FBI Handout), NAVAL HISTORICAL
CENTER, March 1984, http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq114-2.htm (last visited
June 11, 2013).
36. K. Kocjancic, Desertion of Allied Soldiers, AXIS HIST. F. (Aug. 11, 2003,
7:38 PM), http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=29163.
37. Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 719–20 (1952).
38. See Dan Eggen & Karen DeYoung, U.S. Supporter of Al-Qaeda Is Indicted
on Treason Charge, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/11/AR2006101101121.html.
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aid and comfort by acting as a propagandist for al-Qaeda.” 39
Considering the suggestion that the United States could charge
American terrorists with treason by drawing upon the highly relevant
and exceptionally clear lines of the Constitution on this subject, one
should recall that each generation finds texts within the Constitution
that speak to its unique challenges and needs and to its own
communitarian balance. In the 1920s, the ACLU championed and
succeeded in applying the text of the First Amendment to define free
speech as we now understand it. 40 In the 1960s, the Supreme Court
fashioned a federal right to privacy. 41 In 2008, the Roberts’ Court
broke from 200 years of precedent by interpreting the Second
Amendment as an individualized right to own guns—as opposed to a
right limited only to well-regulated militias. 42 There is no reason to
ignore the treason clause of the constitution or refrain from applying
it to American terrorists in this day and age.

B. PROCEDURE AND FORUM
What procedures should be followed and in what forum should
American terrorists be tried if they are charged with treason? Many
civil libertarians hold strongly that all terrorists should be treated like
other criminals—tried in civilian courts and granted all the
procedural protections afforded to other criminals. 43 These
libertarians seem not to be mindful of the fact that, for terrorists to be
tried in this way, they must first be captured and hauled into court.
39. Id.
40. Cf. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.aclu.org/freespeech/freedom-expression (last visited Sept. 11, 2013) (noting that the ACLU was
founded in response to the government’s excessive curbing of free speech
following World War I).
41. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965).
42. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008); see also Robert
Barnes, Justices Reject D.C. Ban on Handgun Ownership: 5-4 Ruling Finds 1976
Law Incompatible with Second Amendment, WASH. POST, June 27, 2008, at A1
(“The [C]ourt’s landmark 5 to 4 decision split along ideological grounds and wiped
away years of lower court decisions that had held that the intent of the amendment,
ratified more than 200 years ago, was to tie the right of gun possession to militia
service.”).
43. See, e.g., Anthony Romero, Terrorists Are Criminals and Should Be Tried
in Civilian Court, U.S. NEWS, February 16, 2010, http://www.usnews.com/
opinion/articles/2010/02/16/terrorists-are-criminals-and-should-be-tried-incivilian-court.
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They are, after all, most unlikely to respond to an invitation to
present themselves—at which point they cannot be tried due to the
American legal tradition’s prohibition against trying a person in
absentia who is not at least present at the beginning of the trial. 44
However, many terrorists, like those in North Waziristan, northern
Yemen, and considerable parts of Africa, cannot be captured without
undue risk to our troops. Hence, a requirement to capture them is
effectively a suggestion—however unwitting—to grant immunity to
most, if not all, of them. Thus, one needs to consider separately two
categories of American terrorists: those who cannot be captured and
those who have been successfully detained.

C. WHEN AMERICAN TERRORISTS CANNOT BE CAPTURED
For those who cannot be captured, the procedures outlined in the
Constitution apply. It states: “No Person shall be convicted of
Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt
Act, or on Confession in open Court.” 45 The term “witness”
generally means a person who provides evidence “under oath or
affirmation, in person or by affidavit or deposition,” before any court
or court officer or any tribunal or tribunal officer, “or in any
proceeding in regard to any matter or thing in or respecting which an
oath or affirmation is or may be required or authorized by law.” 46
That is, witness testimony need not take place in civilian court.
Although the Justice Department White Paper lays out when the
government can legally “use lethal force in a foreign country outside
the area of active hostile activities against a U.S. citizen,” it does not
mention that the United States is already approximating the
Constitution’s process in dealing with those terrorists whose capture
is effectively infeasible. 47 For an individual to be added to the “kill
list,” there must be two independent sources of intelligence that
confirm that he is a terrorist. 48 This condition seems to satisfy the
44. FED. R. CRIM. P. 43.
45. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (2012).
46. State v. Gilroy, 199 N.W.2d 63, 65 (Iowa 1972).
47. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 1.
48. See Jane Mayer, The Predator War: What Are the Risks of the C.I.A.’s
Covert
Drone
Program?,
NEW
YORKER,
Oct.
26,
2009,
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/10/26/091026fa_fact_mayer#ixzz2MC
x8Wqsc (“[A]ccording to the recent Senate Foreign Relations Committee report,
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requirement of two witnesses. The question remains as to whether
they testify to “the same overt Act.” 49 If one source of intelligence
establishes that a particular person was preparing bombs on Monday,
and a second source finds the same person placing the explosives
beside a road on Tuesday, is this the same act? Presuming the
response is in the affirmative, the United States is meeting the
Constitution’s basic evidentiary conditions for establishing treason
for all terrorists, including Americans.
In effect, the procedures the United States currently follows
provide better treatment to terrorists that cannot be captured than to
those accused of treason, by conducting a semi-trial for the former
group. Allegedly, before a person is put on the kill list, presidential
administration lawyers review the evidence against him to determine
whether the target is legally appropriate based upon whether he
constitutes a significant threat. 50 In at lease one instance, President
Obama is reported to have personally reviewed the case, a review not
granted to Americans otherwise subjected to the death penalty. 51 One
could further strengthen this procedure by appointing one of the
lawyers (with proper security clearance) to act as if he represents the
prospective target, like a guardian, without further requiring all the
procedural steps of a normal trial—which the Constitution does not
require in judging those suspected of treason as it does for other
crimes. The main purpose of providing such a “guardian” is to ensure
the validity of the two (or more) witnesses and the reliability of the
evidence they provide.
Kristen Eichensehr argues that slipping away from the protections
of the criminal process “is nearly impossible in the treason context”
the U.S. military places no name on its targeting list until there are 'two verifiable
human sources' and 'substantial additional evidence' that the person is an enemy.”).
49. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3.
50. Benjamin McKelvey, Note, Due Process Rights and the Targeted Killing of
Suspected Terrorists: The Unconstitutional Scope of Executive Killing Power, 44
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1353, 1358 (2011) (relating the CIA’s former acting
general counsel’s and a former CIA officer’s statements that the procedure
includes a group of approximately ten CIA Counterrorism Center attorneys who
prepare memos, which they give to the General Counsel for approval).
51. See Doyle McManus, Who Reviews the U.S. ‘Kill List’?, L.A. TIMES, Feb.
5, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/feb/05/opinion/la-oe-mcmanus-columndrones-and-the-law-20120205 (referring to Defense Secretary Leon Panetta’s
commentary on President Obama making the final decision on the case of Anwar
al-Awlaki, a U.S. citizen, who was killed by a U.S. drone in Yemen).
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because the Constitution “provides specific procedural and
evidentiary requirements for treason that establish a non-derogable
floor of protections.” 52 Furthermore, Randal John Meyer has
suggested that Congress is limited by the Constitution to determining
the punishment for treason and has “no power to redefine treason or
to create new treasons,” while the Judiciary similarly cannot “expand
the definition of treason.” 53 Indeed, when the government
overreached, the Supreme Court overturned treason convictions that
did not follow precise definitions and procedures laid out in the
Constitution.54 In Cramer v. United States, 55 the Supreme Court
overturned the government’s conviction of Anthony Cramer, who
was charged with supporting Nazi saboteurs, writing that the
requirement that “[e]very act, movement, deed, and word of the
defendant charged to constitute treason must be supported by the
testimony of two witnesses” had not been met, thereby setting a
“high bar for what constitutes an overt act of aid and comfort.” 56 This
case shows that, far from being automatic or incontestable, treason
hearings can be thorough and reliable.
Civil libertarians charge that the government’s targeted killing
program allows the executive to act as the accuser, judge, and
executioner, and thus argue that a judicial authority should be
involved. A New York Times editorial in 2010 called for setting up a
court like the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, to review
evidence for additions to the terrorist kill list behind closed doors to
get a judicial warrant in a timely and efficient manner. 57 In 2013,
several U.S. Senators raised this possibility and John Brennan
responded that the idea might be worthy of discussion. 58 In any case,
52. Kristen E. Eichensehr, Treason in the Age of Terrorism: An Explanation
and Evaluation of Treason’s Return in Democratic States, 42 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1443, 1495 (2009) [hereinafter Treason in the Age of Terrorism].
53. Randall John Meyer, Note, The Twin Perils of the al-Aulaqi Case: The
Treason Clause and the Equal Protection Clause 79 BROOK. L. REV. (forthcoming
2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2246981.
54. See Treason in the Age of Terrorism at 1454 (observing the Supreme
Court’s decision to overturn Cramer v. United States).
55. 325 U.S. 1 (1945).
56. Id. at 34–35.
57. Editorial, Lethal Force Under Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2010, at WK7,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/10/opinion/10sun1.html?_r=0.
58. Transcript of Open Hearing on the Nomination of John O. Brennan to Be
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency Before the U.S. Senate Select Comm.
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such a court might be established, although the Constitution does not
require it. Moreover, retired U.S. District Judge James Robertson has
objected to involving the judiciary in the preapproval of targeted
killings, writing that such cases must “necessarily [be] considered in
absentia and in secret . . . . If [an American judge considered such
cases], his independence would be severely compromised.” 59 As it is
a matter of policy, as opposed to a truly ‘justiciable’ case, Judge
Robertson argues that it is Congress’ and the executive’s job to
decide who constitutes a legitimate target for a drone strike. 60 Such a
court would not necessarily be charged with issuing a death warrant.
Judges might simply validate intra-executive branch procedures and
require the attorney general to certify that they have been followed. 61
Congress, one must assume, will continue to oversee all such actions
by the administration. 62 Congress would do best not to second-guess
individual cases, but to review the procedures and criteria used to
ensure that the witnesses are reliable and that examination of the
evidence is judicious.
It is particularly troubling when the United States defines speech
on Intelligence, 113th Cong. 123 (2013) (statement of John O. Brennan, Nominee
for Director of the Central Intelligence Agency), available at
http://intelligence.senate.gov/130207/transcript.pdf. However, civil libertarians
often criticize Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act for approving practically all of
the many thousands of surveillance requests brought before it and for not being
sufficiently transparent.
59. See James Robertson, Judges Shouldn’t Decide About Drone Strikes,
WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/judgesshouldnt-decide-about-drone-strikes/2013/02/15/8dcd1c46-778c-11e2-aa12e6cf1d31106b_story.html (noting that targets of drone strikes do not appear before
a judge, do not have notice of charges against them, do not have lawyers, do not
have the opportunity to call witnesses, and have no due process rights). Prior to
retiring in June 2010, Judge Robertson was a United States District Judge for the
District of Columbia.
60. See id. (referring to John Jay’s 1793 advisory opinion to George
Washington clarifying that the judiciary branch exists to decide cases and
controversies, not policy).
61. Meeting with Peter Raven-Hansen, Glen Earl Weston Research Professor
of Law, George Washington University (Mar. 12, 2013).
62. See Ken Dilanian, Congress Keeps Closer Watch on CIA Drone Strikes,
L.A. TIMES, June 25, 2012, http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/
middleeast/la-na-drone-oversight-20120625,0,7967691,full.story (commenting on
the monthly meeting with members of the House and Senate intelligence
committees that gather to assess the videos of drone strikes and review the
intelligence that was used to justify the strike).
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as treason. During World War II, in both the United States and Great
Britain, propagandists for Germany and Japan, including radio
personalities, were charged with treason and had their convictions
affirmed in court. Mildred Gillars was convicted of treason for
recording a radio drama that was “broadcast by the German Radio
Broadcasting Company to the United States and to its citizens and
soldiers at home and abroad as an element of German propaganda
and an instrument of psychological warfare.” 63 Herbert John
Burgman was also charged with treason for his radio broadcasts
addressed to the U.S. armed forces, which allegedly sought “to
impair the morale of those forces and to dissuade them from support
of this country.” 64 These precedents facilitated al Qaeda propagandist
Gadhan’s indictment half a century later as well as the 2011 targeted
killing of U.S. citizen Anwar al-Awlaki, a chief propagandists for al
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. 65 However, these acts do not truly
assault the community. They do not lead to the kind of mutual
distrust and corrosion of the social fabric that violent acts by
American against American engender. I tend to join those who hold
that sticks and stones will break our bones but words we should be
able to handle.
Eichensehr warns that, “[w]ithout a clear definition of ‘aid and
comfort’ that encompasses those who work for an enemy to produce
propaganda but excludes those who engage in political dissent by
independently agreeing with, but not working with, the enemy,
treason may be expanded without limit.” 66 She argues that the
government can avoid this slippery slope by instead charging
propagandists under the “levying war” prong of the Treason Clause
as this would “limit treason more clearly to those cases in which the
defendant has acted in concert with the enemy in a program of
warfare, and prevent the government from raising treason
prosecutions against individuals who make independent statements

63. Gillars v. United States, 182 F.2d 962, 966 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (quoting the
charge made by the U.S. government against Mildred Gillars).
64. United States v. Burgman, 188 F.2d 637, 639 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
65. See Treason in the Age of Terrorism, supra note 52, at 1455 (recounting the
case of Adam Gadhan who was indicted in 2006 for appearing in al Qaeda
propaganda videos).
66. Kristen Eichensehr, Treason’s Return, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 229,
231–32 (2007), available at http://thepocketpart.org/2007/01/16/eichensehr.html.
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in support of ideas endorsed by the enemy.” 67 One way or another,
we should let Americans speak unless there is hard and specific
evidence that their words effectively incite terror. Otherwise,
American terrorists who cannot be captured should be subject to the
kind of review that is already being carried out—and then killed
when found they committed treason.

D. IF AN AMERICAN TERRORIST IS CAPTURED
There are many reasons that those American terrorists who are
captured should not be brought to trial before civilian courts in the
United States and that their cases should be disposed in another
forum, call it a security review board. 68 Benjamin Wittes, Mark
Gitenstein, Jack L. Goldsmith, Neal Katyal, Philip Bobbits, and I
have previously spelled out these reasons. 69 Hence, this article only
quickly reviews them. The United States and other free societies
already have several distinct judicial authorities to deal with different
kinds of people. The implication of the civilian libertarian position
that all people ought to be judged in the same way does not take into
account the fact that the United States has drug courts, immigration
courts, family courts, debtor courts, juvenile courts, Social Security
Administrative courts, and military commissions, among others.
Although these courts provide the same basic constitutional
protections, each of these judicial authorities adheres to different
procedures and standards of evidence (e.g., in juvenile courts,
records are sealed whereas anyone can obtain adult records through
the Freedom of Information act; all criminal cases require “proof
67. Id. at 232.
68. The term “board” is preferable to “court” as it signals a break from the
civilian justice system. However, the name matters little as long as it is a distinct
authority with its own rules and procedures.
69. See generally PHILIP BOBBITT, TERROR AND CONSENT: THE WARS FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, 125 (2008); Benjamin Wittes & Mark Gitenstein, A
Legal Framework for Detaining Terrorists: Enact a Law to End the Clash Over
Rights, OPPORTUNITY 08: INDEPENDENT IDEAS FOR OUR NEXT PRESIDENT, 1, 5–6
(2008), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2007/11/15%20
terrorism%20wittes%20opp08/pb_terrorism_wittes.pdf (remarking that Combatant
Status Review Tribunals have created a disruptive system of judicial review); Jack
L. Goldsmith & Neal Katyal, The Terrorists’ Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/11/opinion/11katyal.html?_r=0 (recommending
Congress establish a national security court composed of judges with life tenure,
which would reduce the burden on ordinary civilian courts).
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beyond a reasonable doubt,” while family court cases use a “clear
and convincing evidence” standard). Furthermore, the charges that
can be made vary by setting, a fact that has often determined whether
terror suspects are tried in federal courts or military tribunals. Two of
the most common charges made against terrorists—material support
and conspiracy—cannot in most cases be prosecuted in military
tribunals because they do not qualify as law-of-war violations if
“suspects cannot be tied to a specific act of violence.” 70 These are
strong reasons to create a separate forum for dealing with those who
commit treason.
Many of the reasons why Americans indicted for treason should
not stand trial in civilian court also apply to foreign terrorists. Both
classes are often captured in combat zones or ungoverned regions
where it is difficult to collect evidence that would meet the standards
of the ordinary criminal justice system. The nature of available
evidence is likely to be classified and highly sensitive—or obtained
in a way where legality is not fully consolidated and is therefore
liable to be thrown out by a civilian judge. For example, a federal
appeals court threw out Salim Hamdan’s conviction for providing
material support for terrorism, not because he was innocent, but
because he committed his crime before the Military Commissions
Act of 2006 was enacted. 71 Reading terror suspects their Miranda
rights and allowing them to “lawyer up” may forestall the collection
of intelligence needed to prevent a future attack. Allowing terrorists
to face their accusers would expose the means and methods of
counterterrorism authorities and jeopardize their safety and efforts. 72
To reduce the possibility of a failed conviction—which would put
70. Peter Finn, Somali’s Case a Template for U.S. as It Seeks to Prosecute
Terrorism Suspects in Federal Court, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 2013,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/somalis-case-a-templatefor-us-as-it-seeks-to-prosecute-terrorism-suspects-in-federalcourt/2013/03/30/53b38fd0-988a-11e2-814b-063623d80a60_story.html.
71. See Hamdan v. United States, 696 F.3d 1238, 1253 (2012).
72. See BOBBITT, supra note 69, at 266 (explaining that because the
prosecution of terrorists is “unlikely to succeed with the current rules of trial
practice and evidence, the U.S. administration has taken the position that they can
simply be held indefinitely, much like other prisoners of war who await the end of
the conflict in which they participated. Yet a terrorist can also be interrogated like
a spy or partisan or tried like a criminal before a military tribunal (which of course
no ordinary criminal could be). This simply amounts to a refusal to follow existing
law or create new law that is more responsive to our new situation”).
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the government in the difficult position of having to either set free
someone strongly suspected harming of intending to harm the United
States, or having to undermine the legitimacy or the American legal
system by detaining the suspect despite his acquittal—prosecutors
often rely on plea bargains, which guarantee the conviction but
generally result in lighter sentences. 73 This is regrettable even when
dealing with ordinary criminals but difficult to accept when one deals
with terrorists, especially those who have committed treason in
addition to their terrorist act (i.e., American terrorists).
Like all human beings, American terrorists convicted of treason
are entitled to some basic rights. They should not be killed if they
can be captured without undue risk to innocent lives, nor should they
be tortured. Instead of suspending habeas corpus, they should be
subject to a defined period of administrative detention, 74 which could
be extended if necessary upon proper review. In Great Britain, for
example, the 2006 Terrorism Act permitted a twenty-eight-day
period (shortened to fourteen days in 2010) of pre-charge detention
for those reasonably suspected of being terrorists. 75 The specific
amount of time for detention is not important, as long as there is an
initial period characterized by less judicial scrutiny, which allows for
the disruption of possible additional attacks, debriefing of the
terrorist, and deciphering of encrypted documents.
A security review board would be made up of federal judges with
life tenure and “expertise in applying rules that protect classified
information and national security concerns.” 76 Suspects would retain
the right to fair counsel and to appeal decisions to a second set of
73. E.g., Lucian E. Dervan, The Surprising Lessons from Plea Bargaining in
the Shadow of Terror, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 239, 272 (2011) (referring to six
defendants who faced a possible twenty-five year sentence for material support to a
terrorist organization and conspiracy, but received sentences between seven and
ten years after pleading guilty and charges for conspiracy were dropped).
74. See Ashley S. Deeks, Administrative Detention in Armed Conflict, 40 CASE
W. RES. J. INT’L L. 403, 403 (2009) (explaining that the rules governing detention
without trial impose a high standard for a state to initially detain a person as they
require the state to immediately review the detention, permit detainees to appeal
the decision, require periodic review of the detention, and obligate the state to
release the detainee when the reason behind the detention ceases to exist).
75. Gavin Berman & Alexander Horne, Pre-Charge Detention in Terrorism
Cases, UK PARLIAMENT, SN/HA/5634, Mar. 15, 2012, available at
http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN05634.
76. Wittes & Gitenstein, supra note 69, at 12.
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select federal judges. 77 However, detainees would not be afforded all
the protections to which ordinary criminals are entitled, such as
facing their accusers, if those protections would compromise
counterterrorism efforts. 78 Next, the standards for admissible
evidence would be lower than those in criminal cases. 79 While
evidence obtained through torture would be inadmissible, “probative
material—even hearsay or physical evidence whose chain of custody
or handling would not be adequate in a criminal trial—ought to be
fair game.” 80
An American found to have committed an act of terrorism should
not be privileged compared to other terrorists, but on the contrary,
subjected to harsher punishment, as he has committed an additional
crime. The U.S. Code clearly indicates that treason should be
strongly punished: those convicted of treason “shall suffer death, or
shall be imprisoned not less than five years and fined under this title
but not less than $10,000; and shall be incapable of holding any
office under the United States.” 81 Additionally, the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines “assign treason the highest possible base
offense level,” which “requires life imprisonment, regardless of the
offender’s criminal history; a death-qualified jury would, of course,
be necessary to impose the death penalty.” 82 Clear enough.

III. STRIPPING AMERICAN TERRORISTS’
CITIZENSHIP
Several legal scholars and voices in the media who seem to share
my concern that Americans suspected of having committed treason
will be provided with undue legal protection suggest that such
Americans should be stripped of their citizenship. For instance,
David French argues that the current law, under which Americans
“in the armed forces of a foreign state engaged in hostilities against
the U.S.” forfeit their citizenship, should be expanded to include
those who join “any armed force (state or non-state) engaged in
77. Id. at 11–12.
78. Id. at 10.
79. Id. at 11.
80. BENJAMIN WITTES, LAW AND THE LONG WAR: THE FUTURE OF JUSTICE IN
THE AGE OF TERROR, 19 (2008).
81. 18 U.S.C. § 2381.
82. Treason in the Age of Terrorism, supra note 52, at 1502.
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armed conflict (as designated by Act of Congress) against our
nation.” 83 Charles Krauthammer agrees that, “[o]nce you take up
arms against the United States, you become an enemy combatant,
thereby forfeiting the privileges of citizenship and the protections of
the Constitution, including due process.” 84 In 2010, Senator Joe
Lieberman proposed legislation that would revoke the citizenship of
Americans who purposely provide material support to foreign
terrorist organizations or engage in hostilities against the United
States. 85 Obviously, if such Americans were to lose their citizenship
they would be subject to the same treatment as foreign terrorists.
At first blush, this approach seems promising. Treason is one of
the seven actions included in the Immigration and Nationality Act for
which “a person who is a national of the United States whether by
birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality.” 86 However, the act
must be done voluntarily “with the intention of relinquishing United
States nationality.” 87 Furthermore, in Vance v. Terrazas, 88 the
Supreme Court ruled that treasonous actions themselves do not
establish intent; a “preponderance of evidence” is required to
establish that the action was done with the intention of giving up
citizenship.89 Finally, the loss of nationality will occur only “if and
when the national thereafter takes up a residence outside the United
States and its outlying possessions.” 90 Terrorists are most unlikely to
accommodate the prosecution by showing such intent.
Notwithstanding Vance, acts of terrorism should satisfy the intent
requirement. To achieve this end, Congress would have to change the
law and enumerate such acts that provide the requisite intent to give
83. David French, Yes, the Military Can and Should Target American Members
of Al-Qaeda, NAT. REV. ONLINE, Feb. 6, 2013, http://www.nationalreview.com/
corner/340008/yes-military-can-and-should-target-american-members-al-qaedadavid-french (referring to 8 U.S.C.A § 1481(a)(3) (1988)).
84. Charles Krauthammer, In Defense of Obama’s Drone War, WASH. POST,
Feb. 4, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/charles-krauthammer-indefense-of-obamas-drone-war/2013/02/14/3a69d76c-76e5-11e2-aa12e6cf1d31106b_story.html (referring to the President’s power to approve the drone
attack that killed Anwar al-Awlaki, a U.S. citizen).
85. Terrorist Expatriation Act, S. 3327, 111th Cong. (2010).
86. 8 U.S.C.A § 1481(a) (1988).
87. Id.
88. 444 U.S. 252 (1980).
89. Id. at 270 (majority opinion).
90. 8 U.S.C. § 1483(a) (1996).
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up citizenship. Additionally, the Supreme Court will have to rule that
such a move is constitutional. Congress unsuccessfully attempted in
this highly controversial course in 2010. 91 Thus, Congress instead
should assign American terrorists to be judged by a security review
board, following the procedures that the Constitution clearly lays out.
Treason is a term that rankles; it should not be hurled about
readily. However, Americans who betray their community by raising
arms against it have committed a grave offense. In doing so, they
commit an additional crime to those that other terrorists commit, and
they should be treated in the way the Constitution prescribes.

91. The Constitution Project’s Liberty and Security Committee, Statement
Opposing the Terrorist Expatriation Act, THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT (May 20,
2010), http://www.constitutionproject.org/manage/file/402.pdf; Members of
Congress Propose Bill to Strip Citizenship from American Terrorism Suspects,
ACLU (May 6, 2010), http://www.acluct.org/downloads/ACLUReaction
Lieberman.pdf.

